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Don't Ask Us to Explain Ourselves,
Don't Tell Us What to Do:
The Boy Scouts' Exclusion of Gay
Members and the Necessity of
Independent Judicial Review
by
Taylor Flynn
In the wake of the United
States
Supreme
Court's
decision, Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,I civil rights
advocates may want to take
heed of the Boy Scout motto
''Be Prepared,,2-prepared to
see antidiscrimination statutes
rendered toothless in many
instances.
In an opinion
authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court held by a
five to four majority that the
Boy Scouts of America3 is
entitled to ban gay persons
from membership despite New
Jersey's prohibition against
sexual orientation discrimination.4 The Dale majority
sharply departed from the
Court's long line of expressive association cases, in which

The Dale Court takes the
model of a judiciary
neutral with respect to the
marketplace of ideas and
distorts it into a judiciary
powerless to accord
sufficient weight to a
state's interest in protecting
civil rights.

Taylor Flynn is an Assistant Professor of Law at Western New
England College School of Law. Professor Flynn previously
worked as the Lesbian and Gay Rights Director of the ACLU
Foundation of Southern California, where she served as cocounsel for two plaintiffs in their antidiscrimination suits against
the Boy Scouts, Curran v. Mount Diablo Council and Randall v.
Orange County Council. She received her J.S.M. from Stanford
Law School in 1995, her J.D. from Columbia Law School in
1991, and her B.A. from Dartmouth College in 1986. Professor
Flynn would like to thank Jill Anderson, Jim Gardner, Anne
Goldstein, and Leora Harpaz for their painstaking and
enormously valuable review of this article.
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it has rejected the claims of
private clubs that application of
civil rights laws to their
membership policies violates
their
associational
rights. 5
Instead, the Dale Court ruled that
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston6-which
involved a

quintessential
speech claim
concerning the right of a parade
sponsor to exclude a contingent
with
whose
message
it
disagreed-provided the relevant
precedent.7
In order to fit Dale into the
Hurley mold, the Supreme Court
accepted at face value the Boy
Scouts' blanket declaration that
compliance with the nondiscrimination statute would violate the organization's moral
values. In so doing, the Supreme Court simultaneously
asked and answered the central issue before it: Whether
the admission of gay members is contrary to the Boy
Scouts' moral expression (and hence is constitutionally
protected) or whether the Scouts' ban stems from mere
prejudice (and hence arises from precisely the type of
unprotected hostility which the legislation was designed to
eradicate). My disagreement with the Dale Court's opinion
lies not with the ultimate conclusion that courts may reach
in such cases, but rather with the majority's assertion that
courts may not reach any independent conclusion at all. 8
In Part I of this Article, I argue that by "reading" the
plaintiff in Dale as a cipher for gay sex, and by accepting

87

TA YLOR FLYNN

the Scouts' claim of conflict without further inquiry, the
Supreme Court takes the model of a judiciary neutral with
respect to the marketplace of ideas and distorts it into a
judiciary powerless to accord sufficient weight to a state's
interest in protecting civil rights. In Part II, I review
evidence of the Boy Scouts' moral expression and
demonstrate that there are ample grounds to support the
New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion that the Scouts'
exclusionary policy conflicts so directly with the
organization's expressed views that the ban is explainable
only by animus. I conclude with a concern for future civil
rights litigation: that a state's nondiscrimination
protections-particularly for groups not afforded
heightened constitutional scrutiny-effectively may be
eviscerated with nothing more than a potential excluder's
say-so.
AN ODD FORM OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW
When is opposition to a class of persons grounded in
one's moral views and when is it based simply on
hostility? Is it even possible to harbor sheer enmity,
devoid of ideological belief? While philosophers may
wrestle with these questions, Supreme Court jurisprudence
suggests that, at least for the purpose of constitutional
interpretation, courts may characterize some acts of
discrimination as grounded in nothing more than arbitrary
dislike.9 If based on bare animosity, the Boy Scouts' ban
would be essentially devoid of social or expressive value
and would not outweigh the state's interest in combating
discrimination-making the majority's "odd form of
independent review,,10 the pivotal factor in the case.

1.

A.

EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION ANALYSIS

Prior to its decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
the Supreme Court was faced on several occasions with the
difficult question of whether the application of a civil rights
law to a private organization's membership policy violated
the entity's right of expressive association. The Supreme
Court laid out its framework for analysis with respect to
private clubs in Board of Directors of Rotary International
v. Rotary Club of Duarte and Roberts v. United States
Jaycees. I I In both Rotary and Jaycees, the defendant
organizations had membership policies that specifically
excluded women. 12 In each case, the club claimed that
application of a state's antidiscrimination statute to its
policy violated the members' right of expressive
association, and in each case, the Supreme Court rejected
the defendant's argument. 13 First, the Supreme Court ruled
that "public accommodations laws 'plainly serv[e]
compelling state interests of the highest order,,,,14 are
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, and are the least
restrictive means of achieving that compelling interest. 15
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Given that the state had a narrowly tailored,
compelling interest in its civil rights law, the defendant was
required to demonstrate that its expressive activities were
substantially burdened. In Rotary, the Court asked whether
inclusion of the banned group would force the organization
to "abandon or alter" its expressive activities or would
"affect in any significant way the existing members' abilities
to carry out their various purposes.,,16 Similarly, in Jaycees,
the Court asked whether inclusion of women "impose[d]
any serious burdens,,17 on the club's shared goals and
whether inclusion would "impede the organization's
ability,,18 to engage in its expressive activities. In both
cases, the Supreme Court concluded that any burden placed
on the organization's right of expressive association did not
rise to the level of substantiality necessary to overcome the
state's interest in nondiscrimination.
The Supreme Court reached this conclusion after
careful review of the clubs' expressive activity and the
degree to which this expression would be burdened by the
inclusion of women. Both Rotary International and the
Jaycees claimed that their restriction of membership to men
was integral to their basic goals. Rotary stated that its
organization was designed for "business and professional
men,,,19 and the Jaycees similarly specified that it served the
interests of "young men.,,20 In each case, the Court looked
beyond the defendant's bare assertion, even in its written
membership policy, that the organization's purpose was to
serve the interests of men. Instead, the Court reviewed the
evidence of the entities' expressive activities as a whole:
Rotary International's efforts to "provide humanitarian
service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations,
and help build goodwill and peace in the world,,,21 and the
Jaycees' purposes to "inculcate . . . a spirit of genuine
Americanism and civic interest ... provide [an] opportunity
for personal development and achievement . . . and to
develop true friendship and understanding among young
men of all nations.,,22 The Court also examined each
organization's rationale for excluding women. Rotary
International, for instance, asserted that it required all-male
membership to "operate effectively" in foreign countries.23
Rather than automatically credit such rationales, the Court
in each case looked to the organization's wider expressive
purposes and concluded that these purposes would not be
substantially impaired by the admission of women.
Even though Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, like
Rotary and Jaycees, involved the clash between a state
antidiscrimination statute and a private club's exclusion
from membership of a statutorily protected group, the Dale
majority's discussion of these cases was abbreviated and
conclusory. The Dale Court stated, "[w]e recognized in
[Rotary and Jaycees] that States have a compelling interest
in eliminating discrimination.,,24 The Court then
immediately attempted to distinguish Rotary and Jaycees by
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stating, "in each of these cases we went on to conclude that
the enforcement of these statutes would not materially
interfere with -the ideas that the organization sought to
express.,,25 Significantly, the Dale majoritY failed to
mention that the Court had reached its conclusions in
Rotary and Jaycees by refusing to accept the clubs' claims
of impairment at face value?6
In Dale, the Boy Scouts argued that their ban does not
stem from hostility toward gay persons, but rather is based
on their moral code: ''Boy Scouting does not have an
antigay policy, it has a morally straight policy.,,27 The Boy
Scouts framed the issue by asking whether a court should
dictate what the Scouts believe, arguing that "it is not the
role of government to decide what a private organization's
message is" and that "a reviewing court must give deference
to [the Scouts'] characterization of [their] own beliefs.,,28
The Scouts similarly characterized the New Jersey Supreme
Court's examination of the Boy Scouts' expression as the
"reject[ion] [of] Boy Scouting's statements of its moral
values and [the] substitut[ion][of] the court's own definition
of Scouting's moral message.,,29 This theme 'Y~ echoed
during oral argument, with members of the CoUrt asking
questions such as "[W]ho is better qualified to determine
the expressive purpose and expressive content of the Boy
Scouts' message, the Boy Scouts or the New Jersey
COUrts?,,30
This depiction of the issue, I argue, plays on the
semantic ambiguity of "determine." While a court cannot
"determine" the Scouts' moral code, in the sense of
prescribing its content, it is an essential role of the court to
"determine," or find the facts. To be sure, it is not the role
of a court to dictate what the elements of a party's moral
beliefs should be. A court can no more order the Boy
Scouts to believe that homosexuality is "morally straight"
than it could tell the Ku Klux Klan to adopt a message of
racial tolerance. But it is precisely the Court's role to
ascertain whether a precept of the Scouts' moral views is
that homosexuality is immoral. The Dale majority,
however, concluded that the Supreme Court is affirmatively
prohibited from determining whether there was evidence to
support the defendant's claimed exemption from the civil
rights law. Calling the evidence of the Scouts' moral
viewpoint merely "instructive," Chief Justice Rehnquist
chided the New Jersey Supreme Court for its review of the
evidence, declaring that "it is not the role of the courts to
reject a group's expressed values because they disagree
with those values or find them internally inconsistent.,,31
Instead, based on a quote from the Boy Scouts' brief, the
majority stated, "We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion
[that the ban is based on their moral beliefs]. We need not
inquire further.'.32
Chief Justice Rehnquist's statements in Dale that the
outcome of a claim may not tum on the court's view of the
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content of the message, and that an organization need not
articulate its views with consistency or clarity to receive
First Amendment protection, are simply an unremarkable
recitation of free expression doctrine?3 In contrast,
Rehnquist's declaration that the Supreme Court need look
no further than the excluder's unsupported assertion that
its policy is based on its moral beliefs is, as the dissent
states, "an astounding view of the law.,,34 By refusing to
consider whether there is a relationship between the
entity's asserted moral basis for exclusion and the
evidence of its moral views, the Court ignores the
possibility that the excluder's morality claim is merely a
litigation posture.
Undertaking the individualized
examination required by Rotary and Jaycees does not mean
that the Dale Court inevitably would have concluded that
there was no material impairment of the Boy Scouts'
message. Assume that the Supreme Court had reviewed the
Scouts' expression and determined that compliance with the
statute would conflict with the entity's moral views. In such
a case, I may have disagreed with the Court's interpretation
of the facts. It is unlikely, however, that I would have been
nearly as alarmed about the opinion's impact on civil rights
laws-particularly for groups protected by statute but not
afforded heightened constitutional scrutiny.35 Instead, the
Dale majority has chosen an approach that appears to
effectively disable courts from ensuring that an
organization's violation of antidiscrimination law is
grounded in its expression and is not simply a cover for
the very type of hostility at which the legislation is aimed.

B.

MORAL EXPRESSION OR MERE PREJUDICE?

The Dale majority's acceptance of the Boy Scouts'
bald declaration that their violation of New Jersey's civil
rights statute was based on their moral views may
effectively render civil rights protections for many groups
little more than hortatory. Equal treatment of most classes
protected under antidiscrimination statutes, including those
based on race, sex, sexual orientation, marital status and
disability, have been or continue to be subject to moraIitybased objections. Most, if not all, of the groups commonly
protected by antidiscrimination statutes have at some time
been subject to moral condemnation: Less than 40 years
ago, for instance, the trial judge in Loving v. Virginia ruled
that "Almighty God created the races ... placed them on
separate continents ... [and] did not intend for the races to
mix.,,36 Women were consigned, as Justice Bradley wrote
in Bradwell v. Illinois, by "the law of the Creator" to "the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother.,,37 Marital
status, too, has been a basis of moral disapproval: in the
past, objections typically concerned the condemnation of
divorce; today, the conflict more often takes the form of
refusals to rent apartments to unmarried, cohabitating
couples?8 There is likewise a long history of moral
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opposition to persons with certain disabilities, whether it be
the early belief that the mentally ill were demon-possessed39
or the modem-day declaration that AIDS is a punishment
inflicted upon its sufferers for their "immoral behavior.'.4O
The belief that African Americans should not marry
Caucasians, or that women should not be lawyers-both
once enshrined in the law as moral certainty-today are
generally regarded as being grounded in mere prejudice.
This evolution suggests that the line between "moral
opposition" and "animus" can be thin indeed. Even the
language that we use muddles the two. For instance, a
person who says, "Gay people are bad" could be expressing
moral disapproval, mere dislike, or both. Although the
question of whether "pure" animosity can exist detached
from any moral viewpoint is at some level unanswerable,
one strand of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence
suggests that the law views some discriminatory conduct as
that which is undertaken for its own sake and which has no
legitimate social value. In a line of cases including United
States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,41 City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,42 and Romer v.
Evans,43 the Supreme Court-applying its most lenient
standard of review, the rational basis test-has overturned
laws upon finding that they were enacted based on hostility
towards a class of persons.
In Romer v. Evans, for example, the Supreme Court
struck down an amendment to the Colorado constitution
("Amendment
2")
which
nullified
eXIstIng
antidiscrimination protections for lesbians, bisexuals, and
gay men and which prohibited the enactment of such laws in
the future. 44 The Court was faced with the issue of whether
the Amendment's passage was based on a "bare . . . desire
to harm"45 gay persons or was instead a legitimate attempt
"to preserve traditional sexual mores.'.46 The state in Romer
argued that Amendment 2 was enacted out of "respect for
other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the
liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or
religious objections to homosexuality.,,47 The Supreme
Court flatly rejected Colorado's argument; even under the
highly deferential "rationality review" standard, the Court
concluded, "[t]he breadth of the amendment is so far
removed from these particular justifications that we find it
impossible to credit them.,,48
I am not arguing that the Romer Court necessarily
adopted the view that sheer animus is bereft of ideological
content. Although Colorado claimed that it had an interest
in protecting the associational rights of landlords and
employers, the Court did not credit this rationale and hence
did not undertake a First Amendment analysis.49 The
Supreme Court also may take a darker view of actions
motivated by animus when the actor is the state (as in
Romer) rather than a private group (as in Dale): Given the
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and free
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association, private CIuzens have far greater leeway to
discriminate than does the government. Moreover, it was
crucial to the majority's decision that Amendment 2 had the
effect of denying gay men and lesbians the ability to use the
normal political processes to protect themselves from
discrimination. 5o Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in cases
such as Romer, Cleburne, and Moreno appears to
contemplate a form of "pure" animosity that has no social
or expressive value. In Romer the majority concluded its
opinion by encapsulating the wrong of Amendment 2:
"[It] classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.
This Colorado cannot do. ,,51 Assuming this is a plausible
reading of the Supreme Court's equality jurisprudence and
applying it in the context of Dale, New Jersey would have
an extremely strong interest in protecting groups even
from private hostility, on the ground that bare animosity is
not only useless but toxic as well.
The Boy Scouts appear to have capitalized on the
court's difficulty in distinguishing between morality- and
animus-based claims. Despite nearly twenty years of
litigation, the Boy Scouts have not explained how their
ban is related to their moral views other than to say that
being gay conflicts with "traditional moral values.,,52
Counsel for the Boy Scouts opened his argument before
the Supreme Court by claiming that Boy Scouting is "so
closely identified with traditional moral values that the
phrase 'He's a real Boy Scout' has entered the common
language.,,53 Yet the Boy Scouts nowhere discuss what
the phrase "traditional moral values" means to them, or
how these values relate to homosexuality. They instead
adopt an "it goes without saying" approach; because there
is a long history of moral opposition to homosexuality, the
Boy Scouts seem to imply, their ban on gay members must
be based in morality. Crucially, though, the Boy Scouts
overlook the fact that there is also a long history of hatred,
violence, and state-sponsored discrimination against gay
men and lesbians. As the party claiming an exemption
from a civil rights statute, the Boy Scouts should at least
be able to state why inclusion of gay members is
incompatible with their set of values.
Given the
longstanding hostility towards gay men and lesbians, a
court should (although the Dale majority did not) take
seriously the possibility that the Boy Scouts' opposition
could be grounded in antipathy.

C.

WHAT ABOUT THE STATE'S INTEREST IN
SAFEGUARDING CIVIL RIGHTS?

By allowing a blanket statement of "morality" to
exempt excluders from a nondiscrimination statute, the
Court in Dale ignores a state's numerous and weighty
interests in the equal treatment of its citizens. Civil rights
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laws are an attempt to address the myriad harms that flow
from discrimination, such as job loss, emotional trauma,
physical distress, decreased productivity, and disruption of
family life. In particular, state and local governments are
becoming increasingly aware of the enormous personal and
social costs of discrimination against gay men, bisexuals,
and lesbians. As of October, 1999, 11 states and more than
100 counties and municipalities had passed sexual
orientation nondiscrimination laws.54 In light of this
legislation, the Court's discussion of antidiscrimination
statutes in Dale is troubling. The majority's disagreement
with New Jersey's substantive choices in enacting and
interpreting its civil rights statute is unmistakable; the Court
all but says that the state went too far:
New Jersey's statutory definition of 'a place of
public accommodation' is extremely broad. The
term is said to 'include, but not be limited to,' a
list of over 50 types of places . . .. But the
statute also includes places that often may not
carry with them open invitations to the public ...
. In this case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
went a step further and applied its public
accommodations law to a private entity without
even attempting to tie the term 'place' to a
physical location.55
The majority seems to imply that the New Jersey
Supreme Court must have erred in applying its statute to the
Boy Scouts, as such a result had never been reached before:
''Four State Supreme Courts and one United States Court of
Appeals have ruled that the Boy Scouts is not a place of
public accommodation. No federal appellate court or state
supreme court-except the New Jersey Supreme Court in
this case-has reached a contrary result"S6 The Court's
patent disagreement with the statute's application, a
question of state law beyond its jurisdiction, raises the
possibility that the majority may have altered the course of
its expressive association cases to achieve the desired result,
effectively gutting many statutory civil rights protections.
The majority's opinion further suggests that any
transformation rendered by its decision may not have been
accidental. The Court's discussion of antidiscrimination
laws, especially when combined with questions posed by
the Justices in oral argument, suggests that there may be a
majority of the Court which believes that a state's interest in
prohibiting discrimination varies depending on the category
of persons protected. If true, this approach arguably
constitutes a departure from the Court's prior expressive
association jurisprudence. In Rotary, for instance, the
Court-without qualification as to the category of persons
protected-emphasized that "public accommodations laws
'plainly serve compelling state interests of the highest
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order.",s7 Similarly, in requiring another private club to
comply with a local gender nondiscrimination ordinance,
the Court in New York State Club Association v. New York
stated, "[1]t is relevant to note that the Court has recognized
the State's 'compelling interest' in combating invidious
discrimination."s8
At oral argument in Dale, in contrast, several Justices
asked whether the state's interest varied depending on the
classification of persons protected. For example, Chief
Justice Rehnquist referenced a New York City ordinance
prohibiting discrimination based on a person's criminal
record and asked, ''But wouldn't the State's interest be
weaker if we're talking about, say, ex-convicts being
discriminated against than it would about blacks being
discriminated against?"S9 In a footnote to the majority's
opinion, Justice Rehnquist notes in a tone bordering on the
derisive:
Public accommodations laws have ... expanded
beyond those groups that have been given
heightened equal protection scrutiny . . .. Some
... have even expanded to cover criteria such as
prior criminal record, prior psychiatric treatment,
military status, personal appearance, source of
income, place of residence, and political
ideology.6o
This position is an ironic one for Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who typically urges citizens to go to the legislature mther
than seek antidiscrimination protection in the Constitution.61
If the Supreme Court were to adopt an approach in
which the state's interest in nondiscrimination depends on
the category of persons protected, then the state's interest in
nearly every category covered by its antidiscrimination laws
would be thrown into question. Only the categories of mce
(along with national origin and alienage), gender, and
illegitimacy have thus far been determined to receive
heightened constitutional scrutiny.62 This leaves a state
open to an excluder's claim that the state has only a weak
interest in nondiscrimination prohibitions on a variety of
other grounds, such as age, pregnancy, veteran's status,
disability, marital status, and sexual orientation. It is also
conceivable that an excluder could assert that a hierarchy
exists among categories unprotected by heightened review,
which would make legislative choices vulnemble to a
court's subjective views on whether the prohibition against
discrimination based on, say, pregnancy, is more or less
weighty than the interest in protecting individuals regardless
of age or disability. A state's interest in ensuring equal
treatment of gay men and lesbians would be particularly
vulnemble to devaluation, given that sexual orientation
protections remain the subject of heated debate.
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There is a strong argument, though, that a state's
interest in antidiscrimination is always due the utmost
deference by a court because passage of a
nondiscrimination statute represents a form of legislative
fact-finding. By enacting a civil rights law, the argument
runs, the legislature has determined that the specified forms
of discrimination have no place in an arena deemed
sufficiently public. It is a legislative command of equal
treatment, and as such, constitutes a compelling state
interest-one to which the judiciary owes deference.
D.

HURLEY: WHAT BANNER Is JAMES DALE FLYING?

The Supreme Court in Dale based its holding
primarily on its decision in Hurley, a case concerning the
private sponsor of a Saint Patrick's Day parade who refused
to allow a lesbian and gay pride organization, the IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
("GLIB") to march in the parade.63 The Supreme Court
struck down, as a violation of free speech, the application of
a state antidiscrimination law to the parade organizers. The
majority analogized James to GLIB, reasoning that:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St.
Patrick's Day parade would have interfered with
the parade organizers' choice not to propound a
particular point of view, the presence of James as
an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely
interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to
propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.64
There are a number of flaws with the Dale Court's
reasoning. One is the majority's failure to distinguish a
pure speech claim from an expressive association defense,
particularly in the context of statutory prohibitions against
discrimination. In contrast to a pure speech claim, the right
of expressive association is a correlative right that exists in
order to protect First Amendment liberties; as a result, a
defendant claiming a right of expressive association must
affirmatively demonstrate the basis for her claim.65 In a
separate dissent in Dale, Justice Souter-the author of
Hurley-explained that in contrast to a claim of expressive
association, a pure speech claim "if bona fide, may be taken
at face value in applying the First Amendment.,,66
The parade in Hurley illustrates why it is important for
courts to give greater "breathing room" to pure speech
claims. Like a broadcast or a protest march, the parade was,
rather than expressive association, a quintessential form of
speech. The parade provided a time-limited opportunity for
the marchers to communicate their point. As the majority
stated in Hurley, in parades, "performers define ... what
subjects and ideas are available for communication ... [by]
marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not
just to each other but to bystanders along the way.,,67 The
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members of GLIB had wanted to participate in the parade in
order to make a point: they desired to march behind a
banner and distribute fact sheets, which conveyed that they
were Irish, gay, and proud of both.68 In fact, GLIB had
formed for the very purpose of expressing this message in
the particular context of Boston's Saint Patrick Day's
parade.69 The circumstance of an expressive association
case is quite different: the possibility of excluding a member
is a constant, on-going process. As Justice Stevens
explained in his Dale dissent:
This is why a different kind of scrutiny must be
given to an expressive association claim [than to
a pure speech claim], lest the right of expressive
association simply tum into a right to
discriminate whenever some group can think of
an expressive object that would seem to be
inconsistent with the admission of some person
as a member. 7o
The majority in Dale, however, concluded that
"Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would ... force the
organization to send a message . . . that [it] accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.,,7l
This conclusion rests on the Supreme Court's faulty
assumption that James' "presence" (being gay) is all about
sexual conduct. The majority fails to recognize either the
vast complex of attributes that make up a person's intimate
attractions and romantic love or the shared experience of
discrimination based on these attractions and loves. In the
same vein, the majority characterizes James as a "gay rights
activist,,,n presuming activism from James' openness,
outside the context of Scouting, about his sexual orientation.
The only arguable evidence of activism was a newspaper
article interviewing James in his position as co-president of
his college's gay student alliance in which he discussed his
process of "coming out" as gay?3 As Justice Stevens
pointed out, though, the article did not even "remotely
suggest" that James would advocate any views on
homosexuality to his troOp.74
The Court likewise refused to distinguish James'
personal beliefs about sexual orientation (that gay and nongay sexual orientations are equally worthy of respect) from
the question of whether he would discuss these beliefs with
troop members. James argued that he had not and would
not discuss sexuality with members. 75 In response, the
majority stated that the Boy Scouts could select leaders who
"teach only by example,,,76 thereby simultaneously
depicting James as the embodiment of sex and as the feared
homosexual "recruiter" who can teach simply by being. At
oral argument, counsel for the Boy Scouts similarly claimed
that James, like the members of GLIB, carried a banner.
James "put a banner around his neck" when his sexual
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orientation became known to the Scouts, counsel declared,
and "[h]e can't take that banner off.'.77 In dissent, Justice
Stevens replied that "[u]nder the majority's reasoning,"
James' banner was "irreversibly affixed," and it read
'''homosexual.",78 By re-cham··
ctenzmg the Boy Scouts'
exclusion of James as based on his expression rather than on
his status, the majority effectively does an end-run around
the principle that discrimination in itself is not protected
expression.79
In one of many attempts to peel apart the Dale
majority's equation of gayness with sexual activity and its
advocacy, James presented evidence that the Boy Scouts do
not require heterosexual Scout leaders who disagree with
the policy to be banned from the organization. After noting
that this evidence was contested, the majority declared that
even if such differential treatment existed, it was
"irrelevant" to the Court's analysis. 8o According to the
majority, James' sexual orientation made all the difference:
''The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights
activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a
distinctly different message from the presence of a
heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as
disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy.',81
The Supreme Court made no attempt to explain the
nature of this distinctive difference. If anything, inclusion
of the heterosexual leader who supports gay rights and
disagrees with the Boy Scouts arguably sends a stronger
message, given that leader's open and direct disagreement
with the ban. The majority also overlooked the fact that
Scout leaders are instructed to refrain from discussing
sexual issues within the troop and are told to direct the boys
to their parents, teachers, or religious leaders. 82 No
evidence was presented, nor did the Boy Scouts argue, that
James would violate this directive. As Justice Stevens
noted in dissent, the Boy Scouts affirmatively encourage
leaders to participate in civic and religious life, even though
the organization is politically and religiously non-partisan:
"[T]here is no basis for [the Boy Scouts] to presume that a
homosexual will be unable to comply with [their] policy not
to discuss sexual matters any more than it would presume
that politically or religiously active members could not
resist the urge to proselytize or politicize during troop
meetings.,,83
Given the absence of any suggestion that James
would be likely to violate the Boy Scouts' prohibition
against discussing sexuality within the troop setting, it
seems inescapable that the Supreme Court's decision was
based not on anything James might say or do but on who
he is. The majority's reasoning not only pennits the Court
to avoid the application of the civil rights statute, but may
have even greater repercussions.
Recalling another
ignominious chapter of the Supreme Court's history by
evoking Plessy v. Ferguson,84 the Dale dissent suggested
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that the Court is similarly constitutionalizing
discrimination here. "Though unintended," the dissent
stated, the majority's reliance on James' openness as a gay
man to justify his exclusion "is tantamount to a
constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority.',85

II.

THE BOY SCOUTS' BAN: A REVIEW OF THE

EVIDENCE
The United States Supreme Court accepted, on its
face, the Boy Scouts' claim that their ban on gay members
was based upon the organization's moral views. The
Court did not attempt to detennine whether the ban was
consistent with evidence of the Scouts' moral
expression. 86 A sampling of what the evidence might look
like appears below. 87 I do not undertake this review to
argue that the Boy Scouts' ban is necessarily based on
hostility, but for the more limited purpose of illustrating
that, had the Court carried out the analysis required by the
Jaycees-Rotary line of cases, there was overwhelming
evidence to support the New Jersey Supreme Court's
conclusion that the ban collides so directly with the
Scouts' moral teachings that the only possible basis for the
ban is animus.
A.

THE SCOPE OF THE BAN

In spite of having litigated a number of suits filed by
expelled gay Scouts over the past two decades,88 the Boy
Scouts have left the scope and content of their policy
banning gay members improbably vague. In fact, the Boy
Scouts have never mentioned the words "homosexuality" or
"gay" in any of their manuals, handbooks, or guides
directed to either Scout leaders or youth members.89 Nor
have they stated in these materials that they hav.e a policy of
barring members who are gay, which led Justice Souter to
remark that the policy appeared to be a "sort of Boy Scout
.. the contours 0 f the Scouts'
common I aw. ,,90 D etennmmg
policy requires sifting through several sources of
information and then piecing the fragments together. The
first two sources of information consist of the Boy Scouts'
written materials and what they have done in practice-the
known occasions on which the Boy Scouts have banned gay
members. The third source concerns what the Boy Scouts
say they would do in various situations posed by the Justices
at oral argument in Dale. The responses to these hypotheticals provide what appears to be the most detailed evidence
of the Boy Scouts' policy to date.
The Boy Scouts argue that the inclusion of gay
members in the organization is contrary to the Scout oath
and law.91 There is no doubt that the Scouts hold out to
their members the oath and law as the basis for their moral
code. The Boy Scout Handbook ("Scout Handbook")
explains that the oath and law embody "[t]he principles of
the Boy Scouts of America" and states that a boy "will be
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expected to live by these standards [as] a Boy SCOUt.,,92 As
one of the first requirements for advancing in the Scout
ranks, a boy must recite the Scout oath and law from
memory, as well as explain their meaning "in [his] own
words.,,93 In taking the oath, a Scout pledges to "do [his]
best to do [his] duty to God and [his] country and to obey
the Scout law: [t]o help other people at all times; [t]o keep
[himself] physically strong, mentally awake, and morally
straight.,,94 The Scout law provides that a Scout is
"trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind,
obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent.,,95 As
grounds for their ban, the Boy Scouts point in particular to
the provisions of the oath and law which state that a Scout
must be "morally straight" and "clean.,,96
Given the Boy Scouts' requirement that members
learn and understand the meaning of the oath and law, it is
not surprising that the Scout Handbook explains the
"morally straight" and "clean" provisions to the boys. What
is surprising, however, are the explanations themselves,
both in their content and for their silence. Much of their
substance is arguably antithetical to the Boy Scouts' ban on
gay members. For instance, the explanation of "morally
straight" states that a Scout "should respect and defend the
rights of all people" and that his "relationships with others
should be honest· and open.'.97 The Scout Handbook's
section on being "clean" states that "[t]here's another kind
of dirt ... that can't be scrubbed away," giving as examples
'jokes that make fun of ethnic groups or people with
physical or mental limitations" and "racial slurs.,,98
The Scout Handbook's explanations of the "morally
straight" and "clean" provisions are also notable for what
they do not say. Neither passage refers to sexuality, much
less homosexuality.99 The Boy Scouts argue that they are
not required to set forth a list of what is not "morally
straight" or "clean" in order to be exempted from
antidiscrimination laws. loo This may be correct, but it is
beside the point: the Scouts devote an entire section, entitled
"Sexual Responsibility," to discussing a boy's sexual
relationships.lOl Despite having consistently based their
claim for exemption on a purported link between being
"morally straight," "clean," and heterosexual, the Boy
Scouts have never revised the Scout Handbook to make the
link explicit. Nor does the Scout Handbook tell the boys
that the terms "morally straight" and "clean" have anything
to do with sexuality at all. These inconsistencies between
the evidence and the Scouts' litigation position provide
strong grounds for the New Jersey Supreme Court's
determination that the Boy Scouts' ban is indistinguishable
from animus.
In addition to invoking the "morally straight" and
"clean" provisions of the Scout oath and law, the Boy
Scouts' argument relies on position statements that they
drafted in response to litigation. 102 A Boy Scout member
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would have had only one opportunity, in the past two
decades of litigation, to read in Scout literature about the
ban: in an article published for adult members in a 1992
issue of the Boy Scout leaders' magazine. 103 Apart from the
1992 statement, the Scouts have issued four similar
statements, which were sent only to the Boy Scouts' public
relations officials. I04 These do little to illuminate the
substance of the Scouts' ban on gay members. Probably the
most complete explanation is found in a public relations
statement from 1991, yet it consists of no more than the
conclusory assertion that being gay conflicts with their
moral expression: "We believe that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the requirement . . . that a Scout be
morally straight and ... clean ... [based upon] our desire to
provide the appropriate environment and role models which
reflect Scouting's values and beliefs.,,105 Thus, even the
Boy Scouts' most complete statement of their policy is
nothing more than a reiteration of their ''because we say so"
approach. Moreover, even assuming that these position
statements had articulated why homosexual conduct is
"inconsistent" with the Scouts' moral code, the statements'
inaccessibility to members suggests that they may not reflect
the message actually conveyed to its members by the
organization.
A source to which the Boy Scouts point in support of
their ban against gay members is the fact of litigation itself.
While there have been numerous lawsuits challenging the
policy,106 this litigation has done little to clarify the terms or
scope of the Boy Scouts' policy. Neither the issues nor the
factual scenarios raised in the litigated cases have differed
much from one another: they involve the exclusion of an
adult member whom the Scouts learned was gay.107 In their
arguments, the Boy Scouts make numerous references to
past litigation, as when counsel for the Boy Scouts
concluded his Supreme Court argument by noting that
"we've been in litigation on this precise issue for the last 19
years.,,108 Although not clearly articulated, the gist of the
Boy Scouts' reasoning appears to be that, if they have been
fighting over this issue for so long, their moral opposition
must be sincere and strongly held. While that is one
possible conclusion to be drawn from the time, money, and
passion which the Boy Scouts have doubtless expended, the
same evidence points to another conclusion as well: the
possibility that the Boy Scouts' energies have been fueled
by animosity.
The final source of information concerning the
contours of the Boy Scouts' policy consists of the answers
that counsel for the Scouts provided to the Justices'
questions during oral argument. At oral argument, the
Justices repeatedly called the Boy Scouts' policy
"confusing,,,109 and they devoted many questions to simply
attempting to determine what, exactly, constitutes the
Scouts' policy.
The primary aim of their questions
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appeared to focus on determining whether the ban is based
on a member's conduct, status, expression, or some
combination thereof. One of the Justices, for example,
asked, "Are you saying the policy is don't ask, don't tell, or
is the policy, if you are gay you are not welcome in 'the Boy
Scouts? Which is it?"llo The Justices also asked, "What
about the heterosexual Scout leader who openly espouses
the view that homosexuality is consistent with Scout law
and oath ...?"lll "[W]hat if someone is homosexual in the
sense of having a sexual orientation in that direction but
does not engage in any homosexual conduct?"ll2 ''Does
that go for [heterosexual] cohabiters also?"ll3
The result is a patchwork of answers, some of which
appear to fit together and many of which clash outright.
Counsel for the Boy Scouts claimed that the policy is based
on "expression and conduct . .. not ... statuS."ll4 Yet
when asked whether James would have been banned had he
been a heterosexual advocate for gay rights in identical
circumstances, counsel's response was that a heterosexual in
the same situation would not necessarily have been
expelled: "[1]t would be open to the Scouts to conclude that
somebody who is himself presenting a personal example [by
being gay] ... might be more unacceptable than somebody
[heterosexual] who was merely advocating."lls A further
indication that the policy is based on the mere fact of a
member's sexual orientation is counsel's statement that even
if an openly gay Scout agreed to remain celibate, the
member would be barred because ''being openly
homosexual . . . communicates the concept that this is
okay.,,116 Another aspect of the policy revealed during oral
argument is that, similar to the United States' military
policy,117 the Boy Scouts "don't ask" if a member is gay,
but they will ban him from the organization regardless of
who "tells." Unlike the military's policy, however, the Boy
Scouts do not state in any materials available to applicants
that they expel gay members. ll8 Lastly, the oral argument
disclosed that there are two ways in which a gay member
may remain in the Scouts. The first is if the Boy Scouts are
unaware of a member's sexual orientation, since "[t]he
policy is not to inquire."ll9 The second is the only option
for a gay member whose sexual orientation becomes known
to the Scouts and who promises to be celibate: he can
remain in the organization on the (literally) demoralizing
condition that he affirmatively tell the other members that
being gay is immoral. 120
B.

EVIDENCE OF THE BOY SCOUTS' MORAL CODE

Although documentation of the Boy Scouts'
exclusionary policy is scant, evidence of their overall moral
code is abundant As they explain in one of their leader's
guides, the Boy Scouts incorporate games and projects into
Scout meetings that are designed to help the boys learn
basic social and moral precepts, such as learning "to follow
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rules, to take turns, to respect the rights of others, to give
and take, and to play fair."I2I The Boy Scouts' guides,
manuals, and handbooks provide a rich source of materials
to aid a court in determining whether the ban is consistent
with their moral expression. The three values which the
Boy Scouts name as the underpinning for their moral views
are "honesty," ''fairness,'' and "respect for others.,,122
Central to the Scouts' commentaries on fairness and respect
for others are the principles of equal treatment and
inclusiveness. In the leader's guide, Making Ethical
Decisions, the Boy Scouts explain ''fairness'': ''To treat
someone unfairly is to say, 'You don't have the same rights
as others.' Unfairness is treating one person worse than
others for no good reason, as occurs in various sorts of
discrimination."I23 In another leaders' guide, the Boy
Scouts define "discrimination" in a way that would directly
apply to their ban on gay members, as "[k]eeping someone
from something they want to do or join because they belong
to a certain groUp."I24 The Boy Scouts similarly discuss
"respect for others" largely in terms of accepting differences
among people l2S and they caution boys not to use statusbased characteristics to form judgments about people or as a
basis for unequal treatment 126
Significantly, one of the status-based categories for
which the Boy Scouts urge respect is "sexuality," a term that
a court could easily determine encompasses homosexuality.
Indeed, given the context in which the word is used - a
statement in The Scoutmaster Handbook that it is the
leader's responsibility to "steer Scouts away" from any
''forms of negativity that denigrate people based upon their
gender or sexuality"127-it is difficult to imagine that the
Boy Scouts could have meant "sexuality" in any sense other
than "homosexuality." If "sexuality" is so interpreted, then
the Boy Scouts have actually included respectful treatment
of gay people as part of their moral values.
In their discussions of fairness and respect, the Boy
Scouts often refer to the importance of antidiscrimination
laws. For instance, one leader's guide states, "even though
it is part of the American way. .. to talk about 'equality for
all,' old attitudes have not always kept pace with the newer
laws that guarantee civil rights.,,128 One of the Boy Scouts'
suggested activities is to "[l]ead a discussion on the rights of
Scout-age youth-including the right . . . to inform
authorities if someone is being treated unjustly [and] to use
public facilities on the same basis as all other citizens.,,129
The Boy Scouts even acknowledge that compliance with the
law can sometimes be burdensome. In fact, they suggest
that leaders explicitly recognize this burden in their
discussions with the boys and point out that the burden is
outweighed by society's interest Making Ethical Decisions
states that "[t]he important point for young people to learn
is that, though fairness and restraint may not make them
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'best off,' they will be better off than in a society where
there are no rules constraining [their] actions.,,130
The Boy Scouts' discussions of "honesty" stress the
importance of being open with others about oneself. For
instance, the "morally straight" provision of the Scout oath
explains to boys that "your relationships with others should
be honest and open."t31 "The freedom that we all cherish in
our society," the Boy Scouts state, "is based on the capacity
of people to have honest relationships.,,132 A court could
find, though, that the Scouts' ban on gay members is on a
collision course with their emphasis on honesty. As part of
their exclusionary policy, the Boy Scouts state that they
"mak[e] no effort to discover the sexual orientation of any
person," yet another component of their ban is that they will
expel anyone whom they learn is gay.133 Similar to the
military's "Don't Ask; Don't Tell" policy, persons who
successfully conceal their sexual orientation are permitted to
remain in the organization. 134 As some courts have
concluded in the military context, such a policy discourages
people from being honest with others about their sexual
orientation and may encourage gay members to lie about
themselves and their lives. 135 The policy also encourages
gay members, in opposition to the Boy Scouts' moral tenet
of openness, to keep their personal lives shrouded in
secrecy.
The Scouts' ban is arguably inconsistent with another
aspect of their moral code: their assertion that
homosexuality itself is immoral. If the Boy Scouts believe
that gay people are immoral, then it is surprising that they
would knowingly allow closeted gay men to be Scout
leaders. There is no evidence to suggest that a person who
conceals his sexual orientation will be more "moral" than
one who is open; indeed, the converse may be true. The
Boy Scouts could argue that they exclude gay leaders not
because the leaders are gay, but because of the "message"
that being gay sends: If no one knows that a particular
leader is gay, then no message is being sent. As Justice
Souter observed at oral argument, though, no plaintiff "is
using the Boy Scouts ... for expression.,,136 Furthermore,
during the Supreme Court argument, counsel for the Scouts
made no distinction between being an openly gay Scout and
discussing sexual orientation at Scout meetings. Invoking
Hurley, counsel stated that James had a permanently affixed
banner around his neck. 137 If the Boy Scouts' claim for an
antidiscrimination exemption was based on their belief that
gay people are immoral (rather than on hostility), one might
expect the Scouts to take all feasible steps to ensure that no
gay person acts as a Scout leader. The Boy Scouts,
however, do not even take the simple steps of asking
applicants for leadership positions whether they are gay, or
of including a statement in their manuals which explains
their view that being gay is incompatible with being a Scout.

In a final twist, despite their emphasis on rolemodeling, the Boy Scouts state that they will allow an
openly gay man to be a leader on the condition that he tell
the boys that his homosexuality is immoral. 138 This
imposed condition runs headlong into other Boy Scout
values. In the pamphlet that boys must read to get their
"Family Life" merit badge, for example, the Boy Scouts
emphasize the importance of self-esteem: "People who feel
good about themselves help make the family secure. In
contrast, troubled family members with low self-esteem may
be distrustful and suspicious of others.,,139 If openly gay
members are allowed to remain in the organization only if
they stand before the group and forswear their sexual
orientation, to hold themselves up as an example of what
not to be, this would be entirely consistent with an anirnusbased policy. It is unclear which would be more punishing
to a Scout member, being expelled from the organization or
submitting to public humiliation and repudiation before his
peers and charges. It is only by the thinnest technicality that
the latter could be construed as "acceptance" of a gay
member combined with the simultaneous rejection of his
"message."

III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Dale is in part a
Bowers redux.
By adopting the Boy Scouts'
characterization of its ban at face value, the Court
effectively has assumed (with some outer boundary of
impermissible state action demarcated by Romer), that
discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals is
presumptively justifiable. Under this reading of Dale, the
Court need not independently review the facts to weigh
competing interests--even though the countervailing
consideration is the prevention of the very discrimination at
issue. The Court's approach threatens not only
discrimination protections for gay persons, but protections
for other groups as well. Especially vulnerable are
classifications that have not been afforded heightened
constitutional scrutiny and to which moral objections have
been made, such as cohabitating couples or persons
diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. Nor is the Dale majority's
approach necessarily limited to the context of private clubs:
other organizations subject to public accommodations
statutes, such as some landlords and employers, could argue
that their moral beliefs are violated by compliance with the
law. By emphasizing the majority's flawed reasoning in
Dale, civil rights advocates hopefully can cabin the
decision's effect and safeguard the states' interest in
protecting civil rights.
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state-sponsored segregation and rejecting the argument that
"enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority").

"

Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

S6

See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.

Most of the evidence which I discuss was before the Court in
Dale; that which was not before the Court is readily accessible and
could easily have been introduced in any of the numerous
litigation challenges to the Boy Scouts' ban.
17

.. See, e.g., Curran v. Mount Diablo Council, Boy Scouts of
Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal.1998); Seaboum v. Coronado Area
Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995);
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Comm'n on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 528 A2d 352 (Conn. 1987).
.. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2461-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
also Transcript, supra note 30 at 5 .
90

See, e.g., Transcript, supra note 30, at 5.

"

See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief, supra note 27, at 3-4.

92

SCOUT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 45.

93

[d.

"

Id.

.,

Id. at 47.

.. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 27, at 5-7. While the Boy
Scouts do not claim that "straight" means "heterosexual," that
evocation seems to have conveniently inured to their benefit. See,
e.g., Transcript, supra note 30, at 9 (asking "if homosexual
conduct violates the Scout code, being straight and so forth")
(emphasis added).
SCOUT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 46.

79

97

EO

120 S. Ct. at 2455.

Id. at 53. See infra at Part II.B. for a discussion of the ways in
which the Boy Scouts' emphasis on honesty and respect for others
conflicts with their ban on gay members.

II

Id.

99

Id. at 46, 53.

12

Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

100

Petitioner's Brief, supra note 27, at 3 (stating that the oath
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and law "provide a positive moral code ... they are a list of 'do's'
rather than 'don'ts,' setting forth affirmative character traits").

120

Id. at 5.

Boy SCOUTS OF MI., CUB SCOUT LEADER How-To BOOK 21 (1999) [hereinafter How-To].

121
101

SCOUT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 376-77.

102

See, e.g., Petitioner's Brief, supra note 27, at 5-6.

10'

Transcript, supra note 30, at 5.

10<
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 27, at 5 (discussing statements
sent to "Scout officials who might be asked to articulate Boy
Scouting's position"). They are dated March 1978, June 1991,
May 1992, and January 1993. Id. at 5-6.

IO~

Id. at 5-6.

106

See supra note 88.

101

Id.

108

Transcript, supra note 30, at 22.

109
See, e.g., id. at 2-3 ("[W]here do we look, though, to
determine what the policy is, because it is a little confusing."); and
id. at 4 ("I don't understand what is the Boy Scouts' policy, and I
think we've all asked about that.") .

110

Id. at 2.

III

Id. at 3.

112

Id.

III

Ido at 4.

114

Id. at 2.

In

Id.at 7.

116

Id. at 4.

122
Boy SCOUTS OF AM., YOUTH'S FRONTIER: MAKING ETHICAL
DECISIONS 15 (1994) [hereinafter ETHICS] (stating that "[t]he
issues we use for ethical decision-making are honesty, fairness,
and respect for others.").

123

Id. at 15.

124

How-To, supra note 121, at 11-30.

125
See, e.g., ETHICS, supra note 122, at 16 ("ideas," "customs");
SCOUT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 49 ("races," "nations,"
See also Boy SCOUTS OF AM.,
"beliefs," "customs").
SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK 6-9 (1999) [hereinafter SCOUTMASTER
HANDBOOK] (urging respect for "cultures" and "social groups").

12.
How-To, supra note 121 at 11-30 (distinguishing
"discrimination" from "disliking someone after you get to know
him or her").

'" SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 132.
12.

How-To, supra note 121, at 11-28.

129

SCOUTMASTER HANDBOOK, supra note 125, at 43.

130

ETHICS, supra note 122, at 15.

131

SCOUT HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 46.

132

ETHICS, supra note 122, at 15.

'" Petitioner's Brief, supra note 27, at 6.
134

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 953 (4th eire
1996) (Hall, J., dissenting) (stating that the "unit cohesion
hypothesis behind 'don't tell' ... encourages lying"); Able v.
United States, 880 F. Supp. 968, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting
that military policy promotes dishonesty), rev'd 155 F.3d 628
(2d Cir. 1998).
135

The United States' military policy which mandates the
termination of a servicemember of the armed forces for engaging
in same-sex conduct, often referred to as "Don't Ask; Don't
Tell," is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
117

'" See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text. This holds
true unless the applicant somehow manages to track down the
position statement from the 1992 magazine article, see supra text
accompanying note 103.
119

Transcript, supra note 30, at 2.

100

136

Transcript, supra note 30, at II.

137

Id.

13.

Id. at 3-4.
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'39 Boy SCOUTS OF AM.,
(1991).
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